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Abstract  
 The paper assesses democratic governance in the Nigerian fourth 
republic. Most Nigerians expected the return to democratic governance on 
May, 29 1999 to set the stage for the socio-economic and political 
transformation of the country. The paper contends that the democratic 
experience has been problematic for Nigerians. The paper, underpinned by 
the elite theory, is descriptive, historical and analytical in nature and employs 
the secondary source in the gathering of data. The paper argues that the 
uninterrupted character of the democratic transition, improvement in civil 
and political rights and some economic development dividends are positive 
outcome of the democratic experience. Yet, the successes associated with the 
democratic experience seem to have been overshadowed by poor 
governance, the problems of poverty, de-industrialization, widespread 
unemployment, large scale collapse of infrastructure, illiteracy, insecurity of 
lives and property, political corruption, and weak governance institutions. 
Consequently, public trust in the democratic process, institutions and actors 
is in decline. The paper suggests amongst others, responsible and effective 
political leadership and civil society as critical to a productive democratic 
performance in Nigeria.     
 
Keywords: Democratic Governance, Political Corruption, Fourth Republic, 
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Introduction 
 The democratic governance framework is deeply rooted in the liberal 
democratic and neoliberal economic agenda (Adejumobi, 2004). According 
to Omodia and Aliu (2013: 36) the state is expected to practice and promote 
constitutionalism, respect for the rule of law and human rights, popular 
participation, accountability and transparency, and probity in the 
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management of people and resources. These values largely represent the core 
essence of democratic governance. Significantly, these key attributes are 
critical to the capacity of democratic governance to engender and strengthen 
the social contract, popular trust, state legitimacy and enhance socio-
economic and political development in the society (Omodia and Aliu, 2013).  
 The return to democratic governance on May 29, 1999 to most 
Nigerians provided the opportunity to overturn widespread developmental 
and political problems associated with prolonged military rule and at the 
same time a hope of great expectations of improved quality of wellbeing and 
governance. However, many years after democratic rule the huge 
expectations of most Nigerians have been largely undermined by poor 
governance, with its attendant socio-economic and political challenges. For 
example, the Nigerian economy is overwhelmed by the problems of poverty, 
widening income inequality between the rich and the poor, disinvestment, 
inflation, deindustrialisation, mass unemployment and debt crisis. Moreover, 
the crises of widespread collapse of social values, and infrastructure, 
illiteracy, insecurity of lives and property, political corruption, 
authoritarianism, electoral malpractices, politically motivated violence, and 
weak governance institutions continue to undermine the socio-political realm 
in Nigeria (Seteolu, 2004; Egwemi and Aliu, 2010). 
 It against this backdrop that the disenchantment and disappointment 
of most Nigerians with most of the outcomes of the current democratic 
experience of the fourth republic on their socio-political and economic 
wellbeing, as evident in the massive decline in popular trust in democratic 
institutions, processes and political leadership can be appropriately 
understood and situated (Aliu, 2014). Tragically, this development seems to 
have overshadowed some of the successes associated with the democratic 
experience of the fourth republic. The uninterrupted character of the 
democratic transition and improvement in civil and political freedoms and 
liberties for example, appeared to have been lost to the popular lamentation 
over the failure of the democratic experience.  
 The thrust of the paper is an examination of the extent to which the 
democratic experience of the fourth republic has impacted on the socio–
economic and political development of Nigeria. The paper is organized into 
five sections. Section one which is the introduction is followed by section 
two which discusses the theoretic framework underpinning the study. 
Meanwhile, section three reviews democratic governance in Nigeria before 
the fourth republic while section four assesses democratic governance in the 
Nigerian fourth republic with emphasis on both the gains and pains of the 
democratic experience. Section five discusses the challenges to democratic 
governance in the Nigerian fourth republic, while section six which is the 
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conclusion contains recommendations on measures towards strengthening 
democratic governance in Nigeria. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 The elite theory as popularized by Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), 
Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), and Robert Michels (1876-1936) is adopted for 
the study. The elite theory succinctly explains the power dynamics and social 
relations surrounding the acquisition and preservation of state power within 
the democratic framework. Elites according to Higley (2009: 3) are “persons 
who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal 
organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly 
and substantially”. Moreover, the elite theory reveals one of the fundamental 
characters and realities of representative democracy, the balkanization of 
society into powerful minority, who manipulates and controls the levers of 
state power and powerless majority governed by the elites.  
 Although, elites are largely considered as possessing the requisite 
organizational competence and political knowledge core to steering the 
political statecraft within the democratic perspective (Omodia, 2011); yet, 
elitism represents a negation of the key democratic principle of mass 
ownership of the governance process. Nevertheless, the capacity of the 
masses to possess the necessary and proper knowledge, values and skills for 
democratic political leadership is contested. More so, while the classical 
theory of elitism seems to presume elites as a homogenous group, however 
the eclectic character of elites as manifested in their diverse social, 
economic, professional, traditional, bureaucratic and political divisions tend 
to undermine the cohesive status attached to elites. The diversities invariably 
underscore the somehow contending and conflicting ideologies, interests, 
pursuits and orientations and inconsistencies among elites on the one hand 
and the political elites on the other (Omodia, 2011).  
 The manipulative and self centered attributes of elites largely 
underscore the prevailing focus on control of political and state power for 
protecting and promoting the interests of members at the expense of the 
masses. In the Nigerian context, the perpetuation of political violence, 
ethnification of electoral politics, political corruption, hijack of the public 
policy process and deinstitutionalization of governance institutions are some 
of the ways elites are known to manipulate the masses so as to sustain their 
political rule and hegemony (Okoh, 2010; Omodia, 2011). However, these 
modus oparandi of the Nigerian elites do not only lack sophistication and 
civility, but contracts fundamentally with elites in developed democracies 
who accommodates the interests of the masses within the framework of party 
politics and free and fair elections (Omodia, 2011). 
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 The elite theory largely explains deeply the role of the Nigerian 
political leadership and ruling elites in the failure of the state to improve the 
socio-economic and political conditions of the citizens since the return to 
democratic governance on May 29, 1999. The issues of godfatherism as well 
as inter party and intra party violent manifestations in the fourth republic are 
evidence of elite dangerous contestations for state power (Omodia and Aliu, 
2013). Besides, the public character of the public policy making process has 
been hijacked by the ruling elites to promote their interests. It is curious that 
while political leaders of the fourth republic have been able to initiate and 
implement policies that allocate huge sums of money to themselves as 
allowances and retirement pensions, yet most of these leaders find it difficult 
to pay pensioners their meager pension and also pay workers the paltry 
monthly minimum wage of eighteen thousand naira.   
  
Democratic Governance before the Nigerian Fourth Republic 
 The character of the State and its politics is core to understanding the 
performance of the political leadership and democratic governance in 
Nigeria. Democratic governance in the first republic was largely plagued by 
political corruption, kleptocracy, and nepotism. Moreover, democratic 
governance was characterized by ‘the sacrifice of governance and nation 
building on the altar of ethnic, parochial and personal interests’ (Omodia and 
Aliu, 2013: 39). The conspicuous mobilization and manipulation of ethno-
religious sentiments to acquire and consolidate State power and ensure 
economic control were major attributes of politicians of the first republic 
(Setolu, 2005). The development partly resulted in the unhealthy rivalry and 
tensions among Nigerians, and the dangerous conflagrations that enveloped 
the first republic, as exemplified by the 1962 and 1963 census crisis, 1962 
Action Group crisis, and the General Election crisis of 1964 (Omodia and 
Aliu, 2013; Abdullahi and Saka, 2007).  
 Democratic governance in the second republic started on October 1, 
1979 and marked the termination of the January 15, 1966 military 
intervention in politics in Nigeria. In general terms, the failure of democratic 
governance to enhance the delivery of public goods and services and 
promote societal peace and stability dominated national discourse during the 
period (Moru, 2005). Specifically, Nigerians have to come to cope with the 
problems of ineptitude on the part of the political leadership, widespread 
political corruption; identity based politics, massive electoral malpractices as 
well as politically motivated violence. Arguably, these factors contributed in 
part to the collapse of the second republic, with the military overthrow of the 
civilian government on December 31, 1983 (Omodia and Aliu, 2013; 
Olaitan, 2005; Ogundiya, 2009).  
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 The annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections by the 
General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida military regime which would have 
cemented the transition to democratic process of the regime was a major 
setback for democratic governance in Nigeria. The singular action 
contributed in no small measure to the truncation of democratic governance 
in the third republic. Meanwhile, Omodia and Aliu (2013: 39) contend that 
subsequent unpopular policies of the National Unity Government (NUG) 
which replaced the General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida led military 
regime and those of the military regimes of Sani Abacha and Abubakar, in 
the wake of the legitimacy crisis, political upheaval and instability that 
followed the annulment, partly contributed to:  
loss of faith in the state by most citizens, the attendant 
seeking of alternative platforms especially those rooted 
in identity politics by some Nigerians to project and 
promote their interests, the militarisation of the society 
and emergence of ethnic based groups and militias 
which endangered national security and stability in the 
fourth republic.  
 
Assessing democratic governance in the nigerian fourth republic, 1999 -
2014 
Gains of Democratic Governance in the Nigerian Fourth Republic 
 With the commencement of democratic governance in 1999, most 
Nigerians had great expectations that the democratic experience would 
‘enhance and entrench constitutionalism, respect for human rights, the rule of 
law, accountability, transparency, popular participation, and improve the 
economic wellbeing of the people’ (Omodia and Aliu, 2013: 39). The high 
hope expressed by Most Nigerians was borne out of the recognition that in 
the previous republics, democratic governance was mismanaged by the 
political leadership and ruling elite with a great blight on the quality of 
governance, economic development and welfare of the people. Despite the 
popular perception among most Nigerians that democratic governance in the 
fourth republic has failed to meet the high level of initial expectations, 
symbolic and significant socio-economic and political gains and successes 
associated with the democratic experience of the fourth republic abound. 
 The democratic governance experience has remained uninterrupted 
by any form of military adventurism into the foray of politics since it returns 
on May 29, 1999. Although, the country has witnessed the militarization of 
civil and electoral processes, a trend that is dangerous for democratic 
governance during this period. Concomitantly, the country has experienced a 
civilian to civilian transition for the first time in its democratic history. This 
indeed represents a symbolic and significant success for the democratic 
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.29  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
 
 
147 
experience. Besides, most Nigerians, civil society organizations and the 
media seem to enjoy greater freedom and liberties with the democratic 
experience when compared with what was obtainable during military rule. 
 The functioning of political parties in the forth republic, despite 
questions about their vibrancy and democratic credentials, largely underscore 
adherence to political freedom that exist in the democratic governance of the 
fourth republic. Besides, the legislature, regarded as the bastion of 
democratic governance, but in most cases the first and major structure of 
government to be suspended during military rule, exists and continues to 
function since the return of democratic governance. Although, the legislature 
of the fourth republic as represented by the National Assembly is perceived 
by majority of Nigerians to be anti-people and enmeshed in widespread 
corruption. For example, former Senators Evans Enwerem, Chuba Okadigbo 
and Adolphos Nwabara were impeached as Senate Presidents for alleged 
corruption and mismanagement of public fund (Alabi and Fashagba, 2010). 
Moreover, Honourable Farouk Lawan, as chairman of the House ad hoc 
committee on the fuel subsidy scam in 2012 allegedly demanded and 
received $3m bribe from Mr Femi Otedola, a business man whose company 
was being investigated by the committee (Aliu, 2013).   
 Moreover, the principle of separation of powers as epitomized by the 
existence and functioning of the executive, legislative and judicial arms of 
government is a major feature of democratic governance in the fourth 
republic. Similarly, intergovernmental relations and interactions existing 
among the arms of government, even though not as robust as one would have 
expected, but at least, it allows for some degree of debate and ventilation of 
ideas on issues of national importance. Besides, a great degree of 
independence exists among these arms of government; giving room for 
checks and balances on the measure of powers they exercise (Ibe, 2014). 
 The country has also experience some socio-economic and political 
gains since the return of democratic governance. Some of the successes are 
products of some of the governmental policies and programmes engendered 
by the democratic environment in place. Such gains include the introduction 
of new salary scale for civil servants, deregulation of the communication 
sector which led to the introduction of the Global System for Mobile 
telecommunication (GSM) and the debt relief secured for the country during 
the Olusegun Obasanjo administration. Moreover, the passage of the 
freedom of information bill, some measure of respect for the rule of law and 
the economic development vision inherent in the seven point agenda under 
late Umar Yardua represent some forms of democratic dividend. The 
establishment of nine federal universities and the commitment and drive 
towards the deregulation of the downstream sector of the petroleum industry 
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by the administration of Goodluck Jonathan represent some of the gains of 
democratic governance (Igba, 2012). Also, at the state government level, 
states like Lagos, Kano, Rivers, Edo, Akwa Ibom and Jigawa are considered 
to have achieved, to some extent, some measure of infrastructural, human, 
and social development.  
 
Pains of Democratic Governance in the Nigerian Fourth Republic 
 Democratic governance in the fourth republic to a large extent has 
failed to ‘guarantee minimum conditions of governance, deliver democratic 
dividends, and development (Omodia and Aliu, 2013:39). The failure of 
democratic governance is evident in the persistent problems of food, 
employment, security, potable water, accessible health care, roads, 
qualitative education that plague most Nigerians. Moreover, the widespread 
manifestations of insecurity in the form of armed robbery, kidnapping, crude 
oil theft, militancy and insurgency partly explain the prevalent state of 
poverty in the country which democratic governance has failed to adequately 
tackle (Omodia and Aliu, 2013).  
 Elections have been characterized by violence since the inception of 
the Nigerian fourth republic. The 1999, 2003, 2007 elections were marred by 
ballot box snatching, political assassinations, bombings, killings, maiming of 
voters, arson, and abduction of electoral officials (Omotola, 2008, Omudiwe 
and Berwind-Dart, 2010; Aniekwe and Kushie, 2011). Specifically, Ogbonna 
Uche Ogbonnaya, the candidate of the opposition All Nigeria Peoples Party 
was assassinated on February 8, 2003 (Smah, 2008). Similarly, on July 2006, 
Funsho Williams, a People’s Democratic Party governorship aspirant for 
Lagos state was assassinated (Omotola, 2008). More than 300 people were 
killed in the widespread violence that marred the 2007 state and national 
elections (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Equally, the 2011 presidential 
election was marred by an unprecedented post electoral violence, especially 
in the far North, resulting in the death of many innocent citizens (Human 
Rights Watch, 2011).  
 Political corruption has assumed an unprecedented dimension in the 
polity since the return to democratic governance in 1999. The weak and 
defective nature of institutions of accountability and transparency and 
prebendal character of political elite in the Nigerian fourth republic partly 
explains the widespread nature of corruption in the polity (Aliu, 2013). 
Given the revelation by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) that billions of dollars of public funds have been stolen by 
politicians and government officials since the return of democratic 
governance, it safe to argue that corruption, to a large extent is official and 
institutionalized in Nigeria. For example, Lucky Igbinedion, an ex-governor 
of Edo State was convicted in 2008 for stealing more than $25 million of 
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public fund (Human Right Watch, 2011), while James Ibori, a former 
governor of Delta State was convicted in Britain in 2012 for defrauding the 
state of nearly £50 million (BBC, April, 2012). The impact of political 
corruption evident in the fourth republic on socio-economic and political 
development is devastating. Political corruption in its various forms have in 
part restrained economic development, increase poverty and unemployment; 
weaken public trust in government and democratic institutions and weakened 
accountability and the rule of law (Ogundiya, 2010).  
 The failure of democratic governance to meet the yearnings of most 
Nigerians in the fourth republic has degenerated into crisis of legitimacy. 
The problem of mutual distrusts among Nigerians is aggravated by the 
decline in public trust in the ability of government to provide security and 
improve their wellbeing. Some Nigerians willingly extend loyalty, obedience 
and allegiance to ethno-religious and communal groups for protection. The 
unhealthy rivalry among ethno-religious social groups has sometimes 
snowballed into violent conflicts in the country. The spates of ethno-
religious and communal conflicts that have ravaged Plateau, Kaduna, Kano 
and Nassarawa States since the return of democratic governance as well as 
the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency are good examples in 
this regard (Omodia and Aliu, 2013). 
 The masses have been at the receiving end of the poor performance 
of democratic governance in the fourth republic. With democratic 
governance, a system in which the elected officials and political leadership 
lives in opulence and affluence is entrenched, while majority of Nigerians 
live in poverty. Statistics indicates that over 70 percent of Nigerians live 
below the poverty line, while the World Bank ranked Nigeria among the 
poorest countries in the world with seven percent of the 1.2 billion extremely 
poor people (Daily Independent, 2014). The character of the Nigerian State 
and the ruling elites are core to the failure of democratic governance of the 
fourth republic to produce great dividends to the majority of Nigerians. The 
‘Nigerian state by virtue of its historical, socioeconomic and political 
conditions is fashioned to perpetuate elite exploitation of the socio-economic 
and political space and resources, protect foreign interests, promote ethno-
regional and religious antagonism and undermine popular participation in the 
development and governance processes’ (Aliu, 2014: 7). Moreover, most of 
the ruling elites of the fourth republic like most of their predecessors of the 
previous republics are ‘corrupt, self-centered, incompetent, kleptocratic, 
ideologically and morally bankrupt, visionless, intolerant, autocratic, 
dishonest, naive, opportunistic, and parochial’ (Aliu, 2014: 7). 
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Challenges to Democratic Governance in the Nigerian Fourth Republic 
 The failure of the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) to 
conduct free and fair election since the dawn of civil rule in 1999 represent a 
major setback to democratic governance in the Nigerian fourth republic. 
Some of the failings of INEC according to (Aderomu and Aliu, 2011) 
include the inability to provide a credible voter’s registration exercise, failure 
to adequately enlighten the electorates on the electoral process, collusion of 
its officials with politicians to subvert the electoral process, insufficient 
electoral materials, ineptitude, and lack of capacity building. These problems 
of the Commission are linked to the issues of finance, autonomy, structure, 
logistic and security of job for officials. The implications for the polity are 
far reaching. One, the people votes do not count. Two, it makes people with 
dubious and questionable legitimacy rule over the people. Three, the 
situation may encourage the drive towards a one party state. Four, the sense 
of lack of impartiality on the part of the electoral body has generated an 
atmosphere of political instability (Aderomu and Aliu, 2011). 
 Economic development is essential to the survival of democratic 
governance. Lipset (1960. 31) succinctly capture this point in his argument 
that ‘democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more 
well to do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy’. This 
implies that extreme poverty and income inequality is detrimental to 
sustaining democracy (Muller, 1995). Yet, economic wealth of a nation is 
not a precondition for democracy to thrive. Nevertheless, democracy has not 
been able to respond to the challenges of food, portable water, accessible 
health facilities, and good transport system in Africa (Moru, 2005:58). 
Evidently, the economic wellbeing of most Nigerians has continued to 
worsen since the return to democratic governance. The profligacy, corruption 
and waste of the political leadership have contributed to the problems of 
poverty, unemployment, and inadequate access to services. Over 70 percent 
of Nigerians continue to live below the poverty line, the supply of electricity 
is epileptic, infrastructure is bad, the rate of crime is on the increase, 
illiteracy and disease are prevalent and life is generally tough for the masses 
(Aderomu and Aliu, 2011; Aliu, 2014).  
 The massive level of corruption evident in the fourth republic is a 
major challenge to democratic governance. The prebendal nature and 
character of Nigerian politics is core to understanding the problem of 
corruption in the fourth republic. Generally, most politicians in Nigeria do 
not regard politics as a means to offer public service, but as a vehicle to 
capture state power, access and accumulate state resources for personal 
benefits. Evidently, ‘the overwhelming allegations against and in some 
instances conviction of political leaders and legislators in the Nigerian fourth 
republic of bribery, nepotism, cronyism, award of phony contracts, inflation 
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of contract sums, embezzlement, electoral fraud and abuse of office are 
indicative of the ruling elites consideration of politics as the means to capture 
state power and offices for economic benefits’ (Aliu, 2013: 4).  
 The cost of financing the huge ministerial portfolios and special 
advisers appointed by the executive as well as servicing the huge numbers of 
Senators and Honorable members of the House of Representatives makes the 
democratic process in Nigeria to be an expensive venture. Presently, Nigeria 
spends about 70% of the national budget on the recurrent expenditure, which 
includes the cost of financing the large numbers of political appointees, with 
30% of the budget going for capital expenditure. Besides, the legislature and 
judiciary are considered to be ineffective and in most cases do the bidding of 
the executive; which defeats the essence of checks and balances. The issues 
of god fatherism, electoral malpractices and the politicization of ethnicity 
and religion are also major obstacles to the democratic experience of the 
fourth republic (Okeshola and Igba, 2012). 
 
Conclusion    
 The central thrust of the paper is an examination of the extent to 
which democratic governance in Nigeria’s fourth republic has impacted on 
the state, economy and people from 1999 - 2014. The paper contends that 
while there are moderate gains that are connected to the democratic 
experience of the fourth republic, in reality the pains and woes that have 
befallen Nigerians since the return of democracy are overwhelming. The 
paper argues that the character of the Nigerian state, the nature of politics 
and importantly, the failure of the political leadership to provide purposeful 
and responsible leadership has undermined the capacity of the state to deliver 
public goods and services. The result is the decline in popular trust in the 
democratic processes and institutions. Moreover, the ruling elites are not 
sensitive to the aspirations of the public. They tend to dictate and direct the 
outcome of the public policy processes, and mobilize identity politics 
towards their selfish interests. This has constrained popular participation in 
governance; reinforces most citizens’ sense of alienation and 
marginalization, and engendered more inequalities and social tensions. 
Therefore, the political leadership is key to ensuring that democratic 
governance enhances the standard of living of the people, and addressing 
“the fundamental problems of poor delivery of public goods and services, 
endemic poverty, corruption, inequalities, political intolerance, and blatant 
acts of impunity and lawlessness among the ruling elite’ (Aliu, 2014: 5) 
which have become the striking features of democratic governance in the 
fourth republic. 
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 In line with the above, we therefore recommend that since the 
political leadership and ruling elites are critical to the capacity to deliver the 
dividends of democracy to majority of Nigerians, they will have to imbibe 
and practice the core values of good governance and democracy in 
government. The provision of a responsible, exemplary, purposeful and 
service oriented leadership will be crucial to reducing the problems of 
political corruption, politicization of ethnicity and religion, lawlessness and 
impunity as well as enhancing national security, delivery of public goods and 
services, and political stability. The quality of the political leadership is also 
critical to the strengthening of the democratic process and institutions 
(Omodia and Aliu, 2013).  
 There is the need for the citizens to become active participant in the 
governance process. The citizens must realize that they own the democratic 
process and as such they are strategically positioned to demand 
accountability, effective and efficient governance from the political 
leadership. Therefore, the politically active, effective, critical and well 
informed followership is fundamental to making democratic governance 
work as they ‘can successfully challenge and contest the ownership of the 
democratic space with the elites. This can be in the area of agenda setting, 
electoral participation, de-emphasizing resort to ethnic, sectarian and 
religious politics and holding politicians to account for their stewardship’ 
(Omodia and Aliu, 2013: 41). Moreover, to ensuring that democratic 
governance in the forth republic is development and people oriented, it is 
imperative that civil society organizations and social forces sustain their 
accountability, sensitization and mobilization roles. 
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